| The Soviet intelligence service launched what intelligence manuals
still cite as its state-of-the art operation against Nazi Germany soon
after the Nazi attack on the Soviet Union. The Germans crossed the border
into the Soviet Union in June, 1941. The intelligence operation in question
continued almost till the end of the war. At first, the Soviets wanted
the Germans to believe that some church-going royalists were raring for
anti-Soviet action in Moscow.
The imaginary church-going royalists would enable the Soviets
to infiltrate the German intelligence network on Soviet territory. Decades
after the end of the war, the Security Service of the Russian Federation
moved to declassify that counterintelligence operation.
It was for the first time ever that the Soviets got such an exceptionally
good chance to launch a large-scale misinformation venture. They got a
rare chance to lead the enemy up a blind alley and ruin his operational
plans even before the beginning of combat action. More than 70 radio stations
broadcast false information which was reported to the German command. The
Soviet Union played those radio games with the view to disorient the enemy.
An expert in the history of special services, Dr Anatoly Sudoplatov, singles
out:
"Several large-scale radio games that the Soviet security service
launched, with support from the military intelligence, against Nazi Germany:
the "Monastery," the "Airdrop," the "Experience," the "Divorce" and the
"Seminary." Those anti-German operations of the ever-active Smersh military
counterintelligence service were, all things considered, quite a big success".
Soviet undercover officer Alexander Demyanov was put to work under
the name of "Heine." He managed to convince the enemy that his men had
carried out a subversive act on the railroad near the Volga Valley city
of Gorky. To make sure that the Germans believed what Demyanov-Heine said,
the Soviet intelligence service placed several reports on subversive acts
on the railroads in the media.
Another thing Demyanov said he had done was discover an army airfield
on the left bank of the River Volga. Makeshift facilities appeared, even
before Demyanov reported his discovery to the Germans, at an appropriate
site for the make-believe airdrome. Some time later, the Soviet AAD service
said that the Germans started flying regular reconnaissance missions over
that place. Next thing the Germans did was start bombing the make-believe
airdrome. Dozens of tons of bombs were dropped on the barren field. A map
found on the pilot of a downed German bomber said "airfield" in the boldest
of characters exactly where Demyanov had reported seeing an airdrome.
Both the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany took advantage of a lull in
the hostilities for preparation for the summer campaign of 1943.
Several officers of the Soviets' foreign intelligence service were
busy devising ways to fool the enemy. The Supreme Command wanted them to
trick the enemy into putting off his offensive operation. A postponement
in the German plans would give a break to the counterattacking Soviets.
Demyanov-Heine had, in the meanwhile, received a coded order
for weekly reports on operational developments south of Moscow and, especially,
on the situation near the city of Voronezh. The Germans wanted to know
all about the Soviet forces in that area.
The senior officers of the Soviet intelligence agreed as one man that
the Germans ought to be fed very impressive bits of information. They wanted
the Germans to start thinking of regrouping and reinforcing their fighting
units. The dispatch of fresh forces to the front would be far from a momentous
affair. It would translate into the postponement of the German plans for
an offensive operation. Everyone agreed that the job of misinforming the
enemy should be entrusted to Demyanov-Heine. The Germans put absolute faith
in what that source said.
So, Demyanov-Heine started filing weekly reports on the deployment
of Soviet forces south of Moscow. He pretended to have an insider's knowledge
of the Soviet General Staff's plans and would report large-scale troop
and armor buildups between the cities of Kursk and Oryol. The Soviets were,
indeed, amassing forces in that area but "Heine" increased manifolds the
numerical strength of the relocated units. His reports must have given
the Germans much food for thought.
Another month had gone by, and the Soviet military intelligence started
reporting a new German buildup at Kursk. Soviet sources said that the Germans
had adopted new makes of tanks - "Tiger"and "Panzer" - and self-towed artillery
units "Ferdinand." The Germans seemed to believe what they were told by
their Moscow-based source.
The Germans amassed enormous forces in preparation for the "Zitadel"
operation. Although reports from Demyanov-Heine forced them to put off,
more than once, the beginning of that operation, Adolf Hitler had finally
ordered his men to attack the Soviets. The German leader and the Generals
of the German Army were dead sure that their new offensive operation would
be a success.
Would Hitler have launched the offensive if he had an idea of the real
strength of the counterattacking forces?
The "Zitadel" proved to be a flop! Soviet intelligence officers, including
Demyanov-Heine, had done much for the Soviet victory in the battle of Kursk.
It took a good deal of effort, intelligence, ingenuity to trick the Germans
into postponing the beginning of their offensive operation and giving the
Soviets a much-needed break and a chance for a substantial buildup.
The former chief of the Soviet intelligence service, Dr.Pavel Sudoplatov,
quotes the reminiscences of his German counterpart of the war years as
saying that "Heine" wins credit for the repeated postponement of the German
offensive operation. The postponements played into the hand of the Soviets
and paved a way to the convincing Soviet victory in the battle of Kursk. |
