THE SECRET FRONT OF THE BATTLE OF KURSK. PROLOGUE OF THE BATTLE

In the spring of 1943 it became clear that a major battle was certain to be fought near the Russian cities of Kursk, Orel and Belgorod, perhaps, the largest battle of the Second World War. After the defeat in the battle of Stalingrad Adolf Hitler needed an absolute victory over the Russian enemy. The British Prime Minister, Winston Churchill, needed another big battle in the Eastern front that would be strategically important for Britain. The Soviet leader, Joseph Stalin, needed an important strategic victory that would lead to victory in the war.

Nikolay Andronikov, a war historian and a participant in the battle of Kursk explains:

"Our intelligence provided some information, especially information from agents, but that was in April and the situation on the front was stabilized in mid March when we checked the German counteroffensive. A three month pause ensued. That was perhaps the first and only occasion during the Second World War when two equal enemies met. The outcome of the battle depended fully on the war art of the command and the skills of soldiers."

General of the Army Makhmut Gareev:

"Our three fronts comprised more than one million soldiers. We had 30,000 guns and mortars, 4,800 tanks and 4,500 aircraft. The enemy had nearly one million men, 10,000 guns and mortars, nearly 3,000 tanks and more than 2,000 warplanes. The two armies were approximately equal."

At the beginning of 1943 Hitler ordered total mobilization. Even men aged 50 were called up. They were trained for the battle of Kursk. Berlin paid special attention to tanks. It needed to restore the tank force after the battle of Stalingrad. Hitler planned to build a new tank. The new tank Tiger was built for the decisive battle of Kursk.

Historian Nikolay Andronikov:

"Both sides focussed their attention on strengthening their positions. As a participant in those events I can say that we knew in detail the alignment of the enemy. All our maps showed the positions of German forces including artillery. By June the attention of the Red Army had been strained to a considerable degree. Who will be the first to attack? Our force was enormous. But we delayed the attack."

Three defence lines were built in three months. That was a serious obstacle for the enemy forces. We dug about 6,000 kilometers of trenches.

The spring of 1943 was early. Despite low temperatures the roads were flooded. Only the Kursk-Orel highway could be used. Other roads were impassable. Tens of thousands of people, horses, artillery, mortars, fuel for tanks, thousands of tons of ammunition had to be delivered from bases to the frontline. A great deal of work in the hinterland had to be done.

Military historian, Professor Alexander Kolesnik:

"We prepared for the operation and the Germans did so too. Their intelligence stole our people and our intelligence stole their people. We traced all the details and they traced our information. To prevent theft of any staff documentation and to prevent the enemy from assessing the situation correctly we had to distribute food, ammunition and weapons without any documentation. The commanders of the fronts took measures to ensure secrecy. This is how the German command described the situation on the 1st of July: "In the past few months the Red Army has increased the secrecy of its radio communication. At the beginning of the year it became impossible to determine the numbers of army units from Russian secret radio communication, there's been even bigger reduction in radio communication, particularly with mobile reserves. Therefore it's impossible to accurately determine the changes in the enemy alignment." The Red Army launched an active fight against all types of German intelligence first of all aerial intelligence. The Germans did not find most of the reserves of the Soviet high command and the fronts including the big Steppe front."

It should be noted that the German command also demanded that their forces maintain secrecy to ensure a surprise attack. Hitler's Order 6 dated the 15th of April 1943 demanded that the troops "use widely the moment of the suddenness of the attack ". The German command took special measures to mislead the Soviet command. But the German attack near Kursk did not come as a surprise for the Soviet command both in the strategic and operational point of view.