"THE ARC OF FIRE" I. THE STRATEGIC CHOICE OF THE SOVIET COMMAND: DEFENSE OR OFFENSIVE?

The question “where” presented no difficulty, since the only option was the Kursk Bulge, the concentration of the enemy’s main striking force that posed two dangers: an attack on Moscow from the rear or a turn to the south. On the other hand, Soviet forces, in the first place tanks, would be less effective elsewhere. The other directions, even if the Soviet operations were a success, promised no such prospects as Kursk. This was the conclusion the General Staff and front commanders came to in the long run. 

As for the immediate priorities in the war, the matter was much more complicated and the relevant suggestions, different as they were, were slow to come. 

On April 8th the prominent Soviet Military Commander Georgy Zhukov wrote to the Commander-in-Chief Joseph Stalin from the Voronezh front: 

“A Soviet offensive to forestall the enemy within the next few days makes no sense. It would be more advisable to wear out the enemy on our defense, knock out its tanks and finish it off by bringing in fresh reinforcements and launching an overall offensive”. 

The Chief of the General Staff Alexander Vasilevsky shared the view:

“A conference at the command headquarters on April 12th ruled in favour of planned-out defense. Due to a substantial analysis of the situation and the prescience of further developments, the commanders arrived at the right conclusion – that the bulk force had to be amassed at Kursk. The enemy had to be drained of its strength in a defense battle and finished off in the subsequent counter-offensive. Next on the agenda was an all-out offensive with the major blow to be directed at Kharkov-Poltava-Kiev in Ukraine”.

General Sergei Shtemenko recalls:

In the command headquarters we were considering every possibility. The joint organizing effort, necessary in any large-scale operation, proceeded at full speed. 

By that time it had become clear that the enemy would be unable to go on an all-out offensive, neither at the end of April, nor early in May. But the Nazis wasted no time. As soon as the situation near Belgorod stabilized, the Nazi forces started to build defense trenches of the kind we had seen on the Mius River. We kept account of that and in view of imminent advance that should break the defenses the command was working non-stop forming an artillery breakthrough corps, cannon divisions of command reservists and anti-tank fighter brigades. 

Matters still outstanding in connection with the defense and the subsequent counter-offensive were under discussion too. And those were numerous. How to guarantee the success of such defense and is it possible to provide it with a force outnumbered by the enemy? Should an outnumbering force be a must? And where to have the superiority – in the tactical or acting operations, in the army, or on the fronts? The best option might be to concentrate the reserves in the hands of the high command and when the right moment comes create a decisive superiority in strength for the counter-offensive. And it was necessary to decide at what moment the operation should grow into a counter-offensive – the enemy had to be prevented from inflicting heavy losses on our troops. On the other hand, an offensive before time, with the enemy still strong, was out of the question too. 

The two commanders behind the forthcoming operation – Zhukov and Vasilevsky – were with the troops all the time. From morning till morning they worked with front and army commanders leaving only a few hours for a restless sleep. 

June 1943 over… Our defenses had long been ready for repulsing the enemy. The final details of the counter-attack were undergoing a final examination. 

Everyone was sure that the enemy would now not wait with the attack. And as is known, at dawn on July 5th the Nazi forces did launch an offensive.