RUSSIA UNDER NICHOLAS I

Nicholas I, who reigned from 1825 to 1855, found himself on the Russian throne pretty much to his own surprise. This is how it happened: 

Emperor Alexander I “passed away during his trip to the South of the Empire, in the town of Taganrog, on November 19th 1825,” historian Dmitry Ilovaysky writes. “He left no offspring, and upon receiving news of his demise, Russia immediately swore allegiance to Grand Prince Konstantin, who was in Warsaw at the time. Already during the reign of Alexander I his brother Konstantin abjured his right to the throne in favor of his younger brother Nicholas. However, for some reason Emperor Alexander kept this a great secret, so that the people and the army had no notion of the true successor to the throne. However, Konstantin again confirmed his abjuration, and in a letter summoned his brother Nicholas to accede to the throne. On December 14, 1825 a manifesto was made public that announced the enthronement of Nicholas I.

As fate would have it, the first task the young Emperor was faced with was that of putting down an army revolt. Regarding the facts leading up to the mutiny, and how it was put down, Historian Dmitry Ilovaysky writes:

“…wars abroad, and the resulting familiarization of the Russian army officers with political ideas and convictions widespread in Western Europe couldn’t but leave their impact on their minds and outlook. Thus, in the second period of Tsar Alexander I’s reign several secret societies sprang up among the young officers. Their purpose was to dramatically alter the autocratic set-up in Russia, substituting it for the western-style constitutional system. Although the Emperor knew of these secret societies, he didn’t resort to extreme measures until he finally got word of a planned revolt. Not long before his death he ordered the arrest of the leaders of the conspiracy in the ranks of the army, situated in the South of Russia.

Thus, the plotter in St.Petersburg rushed to put their ideas into practice. For this they chose to take advantage of the brief period between reigns, which occurred as a result of the abjuration of Grand Prince Konstantin. The conspirators resorted to deceit. They spread rumors among the lower rank army personnel to the effect that Grand Prince Konstantin had no intention of rejecting the throne. So on December 14, 1825, when the army was to swear allegiance to the new Tsar – Nicholas I – part of the Guard refused to give the oath, and turned out, fully  armed, on Senate square of St.Petersburg, near the monument to Peter the Great. However, they lacked a recognized leader, and the Guard stalled in hesitation.

In the meantime, the Emperor gathered together the remaining faithful Guard regiments around the Winter Palace royal residence. The mutineers were addressed by St.Petersburg Governor-General Miloradovich with remonstrations to show submission to the Emperor. However, there were gun shots in reply, wounding Miloradovich. Then the Emperor ordered an attack against the mutineers. The Cavalry attack on them wasn’t successful, however, once the artillery went into action, the rebels scattered in all directions. A Supreme Investigative Commission, summoned by the Emperor, managed to reveal the actual members of the secret societies and the plans they’d nurtured. The guiltier were sent into exile to the Siberian mines, while five principal plotters were executed by hanging. Soldiers who had participated in the revolt, were exiled to the Caucuses, thus granted a last chance to prove their worth and courage in fighting against the seditionist mountain peoples. 

Thus, the whole affair of the rioters, dubbed “Decembrists” due to the time of their uprising, was closed for good. This revolt, which served as a prologue to the reign of Nicholas I, pretty much determined the general mood of the new authority and the principal direction of its activity. Historian Sergey Platonov wrote:

“…the uprising attempt in 1825 was unsuccessful, yet it couldn’t but impact the new Supreme power in the country. Not only the very existence of a conspiracy and a revolt, but also the plans of the plotters, their ideas and projects, revealed by the investigation, gave fresh impetus to government thought. Emperor Nicholas I and his aides drew two conclusions out of December 14th – one of these, the broader one, could be called ‘political’, while the other was more of an administrative nature…”

The political conclusion was such that the Emperor acknowledged a need for reforms. The second, administrative, was more ‘particular’, according to Sergey Platonov:

“It was no secret that the conspiracy of the “Decembrists” was a new manifestation of the old gentry habit of interfering in politics. Since the 18th century the conditions in society and even the concepts had undergone radical change. Thus, the nature and organization of the gentry’s meddling in politics acquired a different outlook. Instead of the previous dynastic or accidental aims of this or that movement, the Decembrists, under the guise of settling the issue of succession to the throne, pursued the objective of a general state coup. The basic purport of the very fact of the revolt was thus: representatives of a class that had acquired supreme privileges now hankered after political authority. If previously Emperors Paul and Alexander spoke out against the dominance of the gentry, established in Russian society by Catherine the Great, now, in 1825, the powers-that-be were to feel a direct need to rid themselves of this gentry dominance. The latter was no longer a faithful, reliable bulwark that supported the Emperor, since a majority had shifted to the side of the opposition. Under the circumstances, a different ‘pillar’ had to be sought. Such was the second conclusion, drawn by Emperor Nicholas, from the circumstances surrounding his enthronement.”

After crushing the opposition that demanded reforms, the government itself was now in favor of them. Alienating itself from the now untrustworthy gentry elite, the government sought to lean upon the bureaucracy and desired to limit the exclusive privileges of the gentry. These are the initial clauses of the internal policy of Emperor Nicholas I, fully explaining all its features. In public conscience this policy was characterized as “conservative”, for coming up against a revolt from the very beginning, and reacting with repressive counter-measures, quite naturally, the supreme authority sought to somehow shield itself. Aiming to stamp out in Russia any spreading of revolutionary notions and organizations, Nicholas I made a priority of reinforcing repressive bodies of power. Here is what historian Leonid Katzva writes about this:

“A special gendarmes corps was set up, and the entire country was divided into gendarmes districts, headed by Gendarmes Generals, whose job was to elicit and crush in the bud any dangerous notions. The activity of these gendarmes was supervised by the special Third Department of His Excellency’s Chancellery. Inconsiderable in number, nonetheless it spawned a broad network of secret agents, who infiltrated into various sections of society to garner information about the prevalent moods there, keeping an eye on suspicious people, organizing mail cover and manipulating censors.

The censorship codes were frequently altered under Nicholas I, becoming either more flexible, or more radical.  Censors were obliged to ban any publication if they detected the slightest implication of criticism, leveled at the autocratic rule or the Orthodox religion. Books on Natural Sciences and Philosophical treatise were banned as undermining the Orthodox belief.”

Nicholas’ desire to strictly manipulate society’s ideological life increased after the 1830 revolt in Poland (then an integral part of the Russian Empire). The events were triggered by a violation of the Constitution conferred by Alexander I. The revolt was crushed, the Polish Constitution annulled. The Polish uprising served to deepen the fear of Revolution that Nicholas I was haunted by. 

In the first years of Nicholas I’s reign, there was a great deal of work done to codify the Russian laws. The last Law Code was adopted in Russia as far back as in 1649. Since then, thousands of legislative acts had accumulated, frequently contradicting each other. A group of lawyers was appointed to put together the Law Code. All Russian laws, issued after 1649, were gathered together in chronological form. They resulted in 47 volumes of the Lawbook of the Russian Empire. In 1832 a 15-volume Law Code of the Russian Empire was published, which comprised all acting laws. This served to regularize the activity of the government apparatus.

Nicholas I, like many in his milieu, realized the imperative need to abolish serfdom, which was like a ‘powder keg’ under the Empire, about to blow any moment. However, his approach to this issue was mirrored in the words he once said: “serfdom is an evil … yet to touch it now would be an even more fateful evil.”

“In the period during Nicholas I’s reign some 9 secret committees were set up to deal with the peasants’ issue,” historian Leonid Katzva notes. “The reason for the secrecy was that the government was wary of sparking the indignation of the gentry and generating mass unrest among the serfs. The slightest allusion to a discussion of the issue of serfdom would have been perceived by the peasants unambiguously: as a sign the Tsar wanted to give them freedom, but it was the gentlefolk who were stalling him. Thus, the painful issue was discussed behind closed doors, in limited circle, and every time the solution would be postponed to a later date.”

If we speak of the moods, dominant among the educated part of Russian society during the reign of Nicholas, they were mirrored by the numerous circles. The ‘climate’ within these differed. However, two camps were particularly conspicuous: ‘Occidentalists’ and ‘Slavophils’. The first tended to idolize the western culture, judging Russian reality from the positions of European philosophy and political theories. They regarded Russia as backward and badly in need of ruthless reforms. The slogan of the “Slavophils” was “Orthodoxy, Autocracy, National Awareness”. These words pointed to the basic values of the Russian order of things: in religious life, politics, and society at large – all that the “Slavophils” stood for. The goals of the “Slavophils” and the government coincided, so it is rather strange that just like the “Occidentalists” the “Slavophils” found themselves in the opposition camp. The explanation was that the “Slavophils” found their ideal of Orthodoxy and autocracy in the distant epoch of Muscovy Russ, where, in their opinion, the church was independent from the State. They regarded the existing regime as perverse, due to a dominance of bureaucracy in the sphere of church and State life. Thus, the “Slavophils” kept a great distance between themselves and the official powers, - a fact that aroused suspicion against them and invoked their persecution.   

Dwelling on the society’s attitude towards the activities of Emperor Nicolas I, historian Sergey Platonov remarked:

“…An alienation set in between the power structures and those public groups, who, due to their level of education and patriotic sentiments, could well have been of great service to them. Both forces - the government and the public one - steered clear of each other, were mutually mistrustful, failed to find common ground and, alas, both reaped the dire fruits of this fateful misunderstanding… The very brightest representatives of public cogitation, whose names went down in history, were regarded with profound suspicion, much inconvenienced in literary activity, public and private life. They felt persecuted and, accordingly, chafed in indignation. Since the powers-that-be denied them any trust, they were unable to serve the interests of their Homeland. While the authorities, screening themselves off from society, couldn’t but eventually experience the downside of this situation. While Nicholas I was surrounded by people from the milieu of the previous reign, things went well. However, when they bowed out, there were no ready substitutes, equal to them in education, broad outlook and theoretical background. The society wasn’t lacking in cultured, able-minded people, and in the epoch of Emperor Alexander I they all came to the forefront… Yet under Nicholas I nobody turned to the society and received nothing from it in return… All the Chancellery turned out were formalist clerks, far removed from real life. By the end of Emperor Nicholas I’s reign, the bureaucracy system, that alienated the powers from society, led to the dominance of a clerical formalism, totally devoid of buoyancy and infusive readiness for reforms that were in evidence at the outset of his reign.”

By the mid 19th century Russia was a large continental state, spanning a territory of 16 million square kilometers, embracing almost all of Eastern Europe and Northern Asia. Its population numbered almost 70 million people. The country boasted rich mineral wealth, and fields and woods as far as the eye could see. However, despite its size and natural wealth, in economic development Russia lagged far behind countries of Western Europe. It had few industrial enterprises; the agriculture was stifled by outdated methods. Yet, as historian Boris Krasilnikov writes:

“Beginning with the 1830-ies Russia saw an increased introduction of machinery, and by the middle of the century two thirds of all production was mechanized. 1837 witnessed the emergence of the first railroad in Russia, linking St.Petersburg and its suburb of Tsarskoye Selo. It was only 27 kilometers long. In 1851 the railway linked St.Petersburg and Moscow – the two Russian capitals. Steam-vessels were pervading the rivers and seas surrounding Russia, boosting internal and foreign trade. Under Nicholas I over 8 thousand kilometers of roads were laid, and at the Emperor’s insistence, in defiance of the unanimous objections of the ministers, railroads were being built outside the country, too: the Warsaw-Vienna, Warsaw-St.Petersburg lines. All these measures, particularly the development of the machine industry, demanded qualified personnel. Thus, coercive serf labor was gradually being replaced by employed.”

Huge sums went towards the upkeep of the army, the building of fortresses. The army exceeded 1 million in strength. The average annual recruitment amounted to around 80 thousand. The service lasted 25 years. The new conscript was stripped of his rank and became something of a serf of the Army Office. Under Nicholas the numerical strength and might of the Fleet was contained at a level equal with that of leading naval powers throughout the time while sailing vessels dominated. However, in the early 1840-ies England, France and America began the transition to steam and propeller, and Russia started to fall behind.

The 1848 revolution in France had repercussions for the internal policy of Nicholas I. He gave up all thoughts of alterations regarding the peasants’ issue, and his mistrust of all manner of enlightenment grew out of all proportion. All trips abroad were banned, and it was extremely difficult to obtain permission to leave the country. All who displayed insufficient political loyalty were persecuted. 

Speaking about the foreign policy during the reign of Nicholas I, historian Dmitry Ilovaysky noted:

“Of all foreign policy events, chronologically, the first was the war with Persia over border issues. As a result of this war Persia yielded Russia a number of borderline territories and paid 20 million roubles in silver as indemnity.

The war with Persia was hardly over, when military action against Turkey got underway, due to the patronage the Russian Tsar displayed towards the Greeks in their revolt against Turkish domination. After a succession of victories, scored by Russians on land and at sea, Sultan Mehmed II concluded a peace treaty with Russia in 1829 in Adrianople (Treaty of Edirne). Turkey yielded Russia most of the Eastern shore of the Black sea and accepted the Russian sovereignty over Moldavia, Serbia, and parts of present-day Armenia. Russia won control over the Dardanelles and Bosporus Straits. Turkey also recognized the independence of the Greek kingdom – something Russia had been demanding from it.”

However, this was not the last war with Turkey. In 1853 Russia found itself drawn into a war for dominance in Asia Minor, which resulted in the Crimean War of 1853-1856. This war started as a Russo-Turkish one, but then evolved into a war of England, France, Turkey and Sardinia against Russia, with a hostile (towards Russia) neutrality on the part of Austria and Prussia. During the first stage of this war the Russian Fleet under Admiral Nakhimov scored a brilliant victory in the Sinop battle of 1853. As of autumn 1854 all military activity became concentrated around the Crimea, where the enemy’s landing troops had laid siege to Sebastopol. Lacking adequate armament and ammunition supplies, nonetheless the defenders of Sebastopol far surpassed the enemy in moral spirit and military art. There began the lengthy siege of Sebastopol. It continued for 349 days. Alas, Sebastopol fell, and the war ended with the Paris Peace treaty of 1856, which stripped Russia of any right to have a military fleet on the Black Sea. This sparked profound indignation in society. The peasants’ unrest grew in scale. However Emperor Nicholas I didn’t live to see this. He unexpectedly passed away in the very midst of the Crimean war, in 1855. It was said he couldn’t conceive of possible military defeat and consciously rejected medical assistance, thus bringing closer the end. 

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Illustrations:  

A.Pushkin, Selected Works, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1974

K. Tarnovsky, “Illustrated History of the USSR”, Novosti Press Agency, Moscow, 1982