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By Tatyana Shvetsova
“We came out victorious in the harsh, fire-branded years of the Great
Patriotic war of 1941 – 1945, when the very survival of socialism was at
stake under the onslaught of crack forces of world imperialism, and humanity
had to be saved from fascist enslavement. We came out victorious in the
difficult years of the Cold War,” the General Secretary of the Central
Committee of the CPSU Leonid Brezhnev said in 1977. Today we know that
there was no ‘victory in the Cold War’. Alas – it continues to this day.
However, there was a period in the relations between the USSR and the West
– a period of truce, which received the name of détente.
One of the priority tasks of Brezhnev’s foreign policy course was a normalization
of relations between the East and the West. The USSR leadership sought
to establish ‘peaceful coexistence’ with all countries, irrespective of
their social order.
Russian historians Sokolov and Tyazhelnikov noted that the main principles
of the new Soviet foreign policy course were outlined at the 24th Congress
of the CPSU in April 1971 in the so-called “Peace Program”. In the opinion
of the historians, “a particularly noteworthy aspect of the new policy
was the fact that neither the Soviet Union nor the West renounced the arms
race as such. However, the process acquired civilized bounds – something
that was an objective necessity for both sides after the Caribbean crisis
of 1962.”
An academic of the Institute of history of the Russian Academy of Sciences
Alexei Kirillov, reflecting on the reasons for détente, wrote in
one of his articles:
“By the end of the 1960’s the Soviet Union managed to achieve nuclear parity
with the USA. In some aspects of nuclear armaments they were superior to
us, while in other aspects – we dominated. In any case, each of the sides
was aware that in case a nuclear war broke out, it would receive an adequate
counterblow, which would be deadly.
It was this nuclear parity with its imminent threat of a counterblow that
determined the relations between the USSR and the USA. Moreover, it transpired
that both sides actually possessed more nuclear weapons than they needed
for an effective counterblow (thousands of missiles on both sides). Meanwhile,
the arms race was requiring ever more spending… Thus, both sides embarked
on negotiations. This period received the name of ‘détente’.
Vladimir Meylitsev, an ex-officer, who worked in the sphere of space and
aviation technology, and also a journalist, wrote in his article for the
weekly paper “Spetsnaz of Russia”, published by the Association of Veterans
of the antiterror subunit “Alpha”:
“One shouldn’t think that the shift towards détente in relations
between the East and the West was determined exclusively by outward reasons,
stemming from the nuclear parity between the Soviet Union and the USA.
The trend was also impacted by moods and actions of internal forces of
the leading countries of the ‘western pole’. Moreover, as is the case with
all noteworthy changes in the political process, both the upper and lower
classes participated in this.”
In the opinion of Vladimir Meylitsev, one can get a good idea of what the
situation was like at the time from the article by American Colonel Robert
Heinl on the USA’s military policy and strategy in the 1970’s, published
in 1970 by the English yearly “Brassy’s annual’. The article, according
to Vladimir Meylitsev, is a brief but quite comprehensive overview of the
internal reasons that, coupled with external ones, forced the American
leadership to accept the policy of détente.
“The first and main factor that made itself evident at the time, according
to Col. Heinl, was popular antimilitarism in the USA. Its rise was determined
by the unpopular war in Vietnam. There emerged signs of a crisis in the
military-industrial complex. Scientists, teachers, students all came out
against military studies and training programs for reserve officers. In
actual fact this signified a general refusal of this part of the intelligentsia
to support the American military policy. These moods even led to a new-leftist
disarmament faction evolving in the Senate.
The second factor was of a general political level. An influential anti-war
movement emerged in the USA, which embraced representatives of the most
diverse strata of society. These people disapproved of the fact that the
USA was acting out the role of international gendarme. Many Americans at
the time came to the conclusion that America was taking on too much in
the sphere of ensuring security and defense of its allies and satellites.
These moods displayed a certain neo-isolationism that brought to mind the
USA’s self-styled policy throughout the 19th century.
And, finally, as the third factor, which led up to the change in Washington’s
military-political paradigm, Col. Heinl states the movement for retrenchment
of spending on military needs. This movement spoke out for improving the
system of military procurement and better organization of national defense.”
Did the USA’s decision to accept a peaceful co-existence with the USSR
and countries of the Warsaw Pact signify that Washington had renounced
all attempts to reinstate its own world supremacy? Not at all, believes
Vladimir Meylitsev, and continues:
“World supremacy always was and is the principal aim of the USA under any
administration. However, even for the staunchest advocates of American
hegemony it was obvious there was a need for a respite… in the head-on
confrontation with the socialist camp.
So it is quite logical that in the first half of the 1970’s détente
found a great many serious advocates among the American top political establishment.”
One of these was American State Secretary Henry Kissinger. He announced
that he saw no serious alternative to the policy of détente. For
the first time in the entire history of the USA, he said, there was an
equal force confronting them. So it was necessary to go beyond the borders
of traditional opposition and build more viable relations between the two
great superpowers.
Détente began with a significant improvement of the USSR’s relations
with France and the Federal republic of Germany.
When France walked out of NATO in 1966 this became an impulse for boosting
bilateral relations. As historians Sokolov and Tyazhelnikov noted:
“The Soviet Union sought to engage France’s mediating help in settling
the German issue, which remained a stumbling block on the road to acknowledging
the post-war borders of Europe. However, as it turned out, no intermediary
was needed. In October 1969 Social-Democrat Willie Brandt became the new
Chancellor of the FRG. He proclaimed a ‘new eastern policy’. Its essence
lay in rejection of Germany’s unification as an obligatory condition in
relations between the East and the West. This dominating target was postponed
to a later date, and the road to it lay through multi-faceted dialogue.
This enabled as a result of Soviet-German negotiations on August 12th 1970
to sign the Moscow treaty. According to it both sides vowed to maintain
territorial integrality of all European states in line with their actual
borders. Thus, the FRG acknowledged the western borders of Poland along
the Oder and Neisse. At the end of the same year corresponding treaties
were concluded between the FRG and Poland, as well as between the FRG and
the German Democratic Republic.
Another important stage in European settlement was the signing in September
1971 of a four-sided agreement on West Berlin. In line with it West Berlin
was proclaimed not to be an integral part of the FRG and would no longer
be under its control. This was a total victory of Soviet diplomacy, since
finally all the conditions the USSR had been insisting on since 1945 had
been accepted without any reservations.”
These developments served to strengthen the Soviet leadership’s confidence
that a radical shift had occurred on the world arena, with the balance
of forces now openly in favor of the USSR and countries of the socialist
camp. Moscow evaluated the position of the USA and the imperialist bloc
as ‘weakened’. However, as time showed, the Soviet authorities were wrong…
In 1970’s, since the USA and the USSR had reached parity, the question
of arms limitation became uppermost on the agenda.
The aim of the process of arms limitation was achievement of a regulated,
controlled and predictable growth of the more dangerous from the strategic
aspect type of weapons – intercontinental ballistic missiles.
At this point the visit of American President Richard Nixon to Moscow in
May 1972 had a vital significance. In the course of the visit the process
of détente received a tremendous boost. Nixon and Brezhnev signed
the “Fundamentals of relations between the USSR and the USA”. This document
stated that ‘in the nuclear age there could be no other basis for relations
other than peaceful co-existence’. On May 26th 1972 a Temporary treaty
(Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty) was signed on measures in the sphere
of limiting strategic offensive weapons for a term of five years – later
the treaty came to be known as SALT-1. This treaty delimited the number
of nuclear carriers for both sides. In the summer of 1973, during
Leonid Brezhnev’s visit to the USA, an agreement was also signed on the
aversion of a nuclear war.
What was certainly gratifying was that military-political negotiations
were accompanied by a broadening of economic, scientific and cultural cooperation.
Let’s turn to memoirs of a direct participant of the events, the then Minister
of the Press, the late Boris Stukalin:
“During my first visit to the USA in 1973, at the invitation of the Association
of American publishers, I spent almost an entire day as guest of a prominent
publisher of scientific and technical literature Bradford Wiley. We had
a good relationship with the company “Wiley and son”. That time we agreed
to significantly broaden our cooperation. The owner was obviously satisfied,
and anxious to please his soviet partner, he offered: “Would you like to
visit the Sate Department and meet with the State Secretary? A lot in the
cultural ties between our countries hinges on the position of the State
Department.”
Since I was not empowered to embark on encounters of such rank, I felt
awkward… However, misinterpreting my hesitation, Wiley remarked: “You don’t
have to do anything! I’ll set it up myself: State Secretary Bill Rogers
and I went to college together. I’ll give him a call.” Without waiting
for me to respond, Bradford picked up the phone and in a minute was already
speaking to his one-time college mate. “There, it’s all settled! Rogers
will be expecting us tomorrow morning at 11…”
I couldn’t refuse, so in the evening I called our Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin
and explained the situation. The Ambassador was quite happy with the way
things had worked out. “You must go to the State Department, and put before
them a set of questions relating to cultural exchanges. Up until now the
State Department hasn’t been very eager to broaden such ties.”
The meeting turned out both interesting and unexpectedly worthwhile. We
managed to solicit the State Department’s support for a program of exchange
of translators, trainees, exhibitions, etc. When leaving, I presented Rogers
with several soviet books, including a two-volume edition of Leo Tolstoy
in English translation (Wiley had told me the State Secretary’s wife particularly
liked reading our great classic). I also asked them to pass on to Richard
Nixon several albums of reproductions of Russian painters.
Upon my arrival in Moscow one of the staff workers of the American embassy
handed me a personal message from the USA President, brief but polite,
where he thanked me for the albums and informed me that they would make
a desired contribution to his library”.
It’s interesting to read Boris Stukalin’s opinion regarding Richard Nixon
and his role in the détente process:
“Nixon, while remaining true to his class positions, never betraying his
convictions, at the same time advocated cooperation with the USSR in the
sphere of limiting weapons and averting a military conflagration between
the two superpowers. I would hazard to say that none of the post-war Presidents
of the USA did as much for bringing our two countries closer together and
for strengthening International security. Of course, there was a certain
hesitancy and inconsistency in the President’s actions, since he was under
a lot of pressure from various sides. However, displaying political foresight
and pragmatic approach, coupled with personal courage, Nixon nonetheless
made headway in bringing about the signing with the USSR of such strategically
important treaties as SALT-1, the ABM treaty, and a number of others, which
for decades served as a basis for stability and international security.
He also supported our country’s idea of creating a system of All-European
security. Under his Presidency regular Soviet-American summit meetings
and confidential diplomatic contacts became an effective instrument of
solving a highly complex set of problems in bilateral relations.
It was with such a weighty political reputation of a man who knew how to
find a common language with soviet leaders and reply to the challenges
of the time, that President Nixon arrived in Moscow [in June 1974]. However,
this was no longer the Nixon that they’d known in the USSR. The Watergate
scandal, cleverly blown out of all proportion by his opponents, had reached
its peak. And while during the meeting in Washington he had demonstrated
tranquility and confidence in his own future, on this occasion he looked
worried and harassed. Obviously, he was acknowledging to himself the fact
that he would soon have to part with the White House. This threw him off
the rails… He was lethargic during the talks, made only the briefest of
remarks of a fundamental nature, leaving it to the State Secretary Kissinger
and other delegation members to lead the discussions and elaborate specific
agreements. He was often contemplative and pensive… Our Ambassador in the
USA Anatoly Dobrynin told me that not long before leaving for Moscow the
President had complained to him in a harsh manner about the cunning intrigues
of the leaders of the Jewish community in the USA… Apparently, the latter
couldn’t forgive him his independent and resolute manner of conducting
foreign policy and inadequate, in their opinion, support for Israel in
the latter’s struggle against the Arabs. In a word, opponents of détente
and agreements with the USSR plagued Nixon and were close to achieving
their aim – removing him from power.
It was only at the final reception at the residence of the American Ambassador
Stessel that we saw a glimpse of the Nixon we remembered: sure of himself,
witty and buoyant. One could only guess what an effort it cost him.
At the lunch he came out with an emotionally-charged speech on Soviet-American
relations, giving a very high appraisal of the results achieved, and positively
assessing prospects for our future cooperation. He spoke of Leonid Brezhnev
with such respect and warmth, that I recall thinking: none of the leaders
of socialist countries had even displayed such a good-natured loyalty to
the USSR and its leaders. It sounded very much like a farewell, and, quite
possibly, a bequeathal to those who would succeed him at the State helm.
When we sat down to the dining tables, we each saw a cardboard box in front
of us with a large bronze medal inside, depicting the President of the
USA and the dates of his visit to the Soviet Union. A farewell souvenir…
Less than two months later he was obliged to announce his early resignation.
Leonid Brezhnev and Richard Nixon signed in 1972 and 1973 numerous agreements
in diverse spheres: science, culture, trade, etc. AS a result, the volume
of Soviet-American trade, for example, grew several-fold. A significant
share of this trade was taken up by imports of American grain to the USSR.
It would be hard to overestimate the significance of the May 1972 treaty
between the URRS and USA on cooperation in studying space for peaceful
purposes. A huge breakthrough in this sphere was the joint flight of Soviet
cosmonauts and American astronauts on the “Soyuz-19” and “Apollo” spaceships.
The flight lasted 7 days – from the 15th to the 21st of July 1975. This
was historically the first joint space flight of representatives of different
countries.
The crew of the Soviet “Soyuz-19” spaceship comprised cosmonauts Alexei
Leonov and Valeri Kubasov. While the crew of the American “Apollo” consisted
of astronauts Tomas Stafford, Vance Brandt and Donald Slayton.
The Soviet and American spaceships docked on July 17th 1975 thus symbolizing
the future International space station. The captains of the crews Alexei
Leonov and Thomas Stafford shook hands, passing from one spaceship into
the other. There followed an exchange of flags of the USSR and USA, souvenirs,
and then the spacemen enjoyed a joint dinner in orbit.
During the “Soyuz-19” and “Apollo” flights a series of extremely valuable
scientific experiments were carried out. The “Soyuz-Apollo” project went
down in history as a giant step forward on the road of conquering space
through joint efforts of different countries. That was a glorious page
in the history of Soviet-American relations, as well as in the history
of the development of world science and technology.
Alas, in the sphere of disarmament things were proceeding with far less
success. Let me remind you that Richard Nixon saw things through to the
signing with the USSR of an agreement on the limitation of Anti-Ballistic
Missile Defence Treaty as well as the SALT-1 treaty. The latter was a temporary
agreement on measures in the sphere of limitation of strategic offensive
weapons, for a term of 5 years. This treaty set the marginal number of
nuclear carriers for both sides.
Assessing SALT-1, historians Sokolov and Tyazhelnikov noted:
“The parity, set down in SALT-1, didn’t stop the arms race. This paradoxical
situation became a result of the concept of ‘nuclear deterrent’. Its essence
lay in that the leadership of both countries realized the impossibility
of using nuclear weapons for political or even more so – military purposes.
However, both sides continued to augment their military potential, including
missile potential, so as not to allow the supremacy of ‘the potential enemy’,
and hopefully – to outstrip the adversary in this aspect. In reality the
concept of ‘nuclear deterrent’ spurred on confrontation between the Western
and Eastern blocs, and fed the arms race.”
In November 1974 at the meeting between Leonid Brezhnev and the new American
President Gerald Ford in the Far Eastern Russian town of Vladivostok, the
USSR and USA managed to come to term son a new agreement regarding the
Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty – SALT-2. This agreement was to regulate
a broader spectrum of armaments. The signing of the treaty was scheduled
for 1977. However, this didn’t happen, since a new type of weapons emerged
in the USA – cruise missiles. In the USA they adamantly refused to take
into account the permissible limit for new types of weapons. The position
of the USA was a result of the general deterioration of Soviet-USA relations,
beginning with 1975. Generally, if we speak of all participants of the
process of détente, the Soviet leadership and its western partners
were unable to use all possibilities for deepening the process of détente.
Professor of Moscow State Institute of International relations at the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs Mikhail Norinsky noted in this respect:
“Political détente wasn’t corroborated by corresponding measures
in the military field. Each of the sides was striving to ‘outwit’ the rival…
The Soviet leadership was appraising the European situation in many regards
through the prism of its face-off with the USA, while such an outlook didn’t
always provide the right view of events. At the same time Washington was
closely watching, with unconcealed suspicion, the international activity
of its west-European allies. The USA feared a possible weakening of Atlantic
solidarity and excessive independence of Europeans. Europe remained a vitally
important field of action in the Cold War, even if the dangerous crises
and sharp confrontation had been succeeded by diplomatic maneuvers and
foreign policy actions.”
Russian historian Oleg Platonov, who tends to brand Soviet foreign policy
dating to Brezhnev’s time as very weak, deplores the fact that during the
period of détente our diplomats made far too many concessions to
the West in detriment to our country’s interests. He writes: “So called
policy of détente, which continued from the end of the 1960’s to
the end of the 1970’s, was in actual fact a policy of gradual capitulation
of the USSR as a superpower before the West, primarily – the USA. It was
in conditions of this policy that the West was given a real insight into
the internal weakness, unprincipled nature and spiritual insolvency of
the Soviet party leadership.
As KGB General Nikolai Leonov justly noted in his book “The Hard Times”:
psychologically the USA never accepted the Soviet Union as an equal partner.
All the work of the American diplomats was built on the original principle
of the USA’s supremacy over the USSR, which simply needed to be fixed in
the final documents (signed in the course of détente).
Many themes, closely linked with International security, were struck off
by the American side from the negotiating program outright, as inconsistent
with their own national interests. Thus, this was the fate of the soviet
suggestions regarding a renunciation of initiative in a possible nuclear
assault, the demilitarization of space, limitation of the military confrontation
in the Indian ocean and a series of others. Other problems – antimissile
defense, reduction of strategic offensive weapons, a ban on underground
nuclear tests – were fraught with procrastinated many-year long negotiations
and fence-sitting. In the course of these sessions the USA, observing the
increasingly distressing economic plight of the USSR, simply awaited the
moment when the USSR leadership would waver and finally concede to their
terms.
In the opinion of Oleg Platonov, bitter as it might sound for Soviet diplomats,
at the bargaining table the USA invariably outplayed the USSR. The American
side gradually limited, curbed soviet ambitions. They were prudently laying
down landmarks for possible future world developments. The historian insists,
“détente, launched by the Soviet authorities at a time when the
USA was enmeshed in an aggressive war in Vietnam, was a disgrace for the
USSR’s foreign policy. It provided the aggressor with one-sided advantages,
as well as a possibility of toning down the pressure it was under from
the East.
It was after the shameful ‘détente’ that Ronald Regan’s aggressive
hegemonic policy became possible, as well as a successful series of subversive
programs against Russia.”
At this point one recalls the gaffe made by Ronald Regan during a rehearsal
of his television address of August 13th 1984, which accidentally went
on air: “My Fellow Americans! I am pleased to tell you that I just signed
legislation which outlaws Russia forever. The bombing begins in five minutes”.
From the mid 1950’s the Soviet Union was striving to achieve the establishment
of a system of collective security in Europe. The essence of the soviet
proposals was the idea of concluding a pan-European treaty on joint security,
under the condition that all participants renounce use of military force.
Instead, in the case of any debatable issues or potential conflicts, it
was advised to resort to consultations. Back in the 1950’s these suggestions
never did get off the ground.
A second attempt was made in the 1960’s. In July 1966 at a meeting of the
Political consultative committee of the Warsaw pact, in Bucharest, the
idea was put forward of organizing an all-European conference on problems
of security and cooperation in Europe. Socialist countries were suggesting
that a declaration be signed at the conference on cooperation in the interests
of preserving and strengthening European security. Members of the Warsaw
Pact motioned their initiative as a basis for further discussions.
Later, in 1967, the suggestion for holding a pan-European conference emerged
in Soviet-French joint documents. Paris supported Moscow’s stance and intended
to play a principal role in conducting the pan-European conference. An
expert on International relations and Russian foreign policy, Professor
of Moscow’s Institute of Foreign Relations Mikhail Norinsky wrote:
“The Soviet-French declaration, signed in October 1971, not only voiced
a desire to speedily begin many-sided preparations for such a pan-European
conference, but laid down its chief tasks. They consisted in, firstly,
assisting in achieving a gradual transformation of relations between European
states, enabling the continent to bridge the rift between military blocs.
Secondly, it was suggested to strengthen European security ‘via establishing
a system of obligations, which would rule out any threat of force or its
use in mutual relations between states. At the same time there would be
a strict honoring of territorial sovereignty of states, non-interference
in their internal affairs, equality and independence.”
The conference was called upon to bring about development of economic and
trade ties, industrial and technical cooperation, cultural exchange, scientific
and people-to-people contacts between European states.
An important contribution in laying the groundwork for a pan-European conference
was made by the ‘new Eastern policy’ of the Federative Republic of Germany,
which served to untangle a number of complex knots in the European political
situation.
By the end of the 1970’s contacts between European countries showed up
a quite significant zone of mutual understanding regarding the basic issues
of preparing a pan-European conference. Bearing in mind the emerging accord,
the government of Finland sent all possible participants of the pan-European
conference a memorandum concerning preparatory meetings of representatives
of all interested sides in Helsinki”.
Moscow’s contacts with west-European political leaders showed that the
convocation of a pan-European conference was impossible without the consent
of the USA. The USSR agreed to the participation of the USA and Canada
in the conference. However, the American leadership did its utmost to hamper
its convocation. The American administration tried to put a brake on the
process of developing relations between the Soviet Union and countries
of Western Europe. Officially, Washington alluded to the non-existence
of a political basis for improvement of relations between the East and
the West.
Only after the successful conclusion of four-sided negotiations regarding
West Berlin, as well as the successful visit of President Nixon to Moscow
in May 1972 did the American side give its consent to the beginning of
consultations on convening a pan-European conference.
Omitting the details of its preparation, let us only say that it took place
in 1975 in Finland’s capital Helsinki. Its result was the signing of a
Comprehensive Treaty on Security and Cooperation in Europe. Historian Leonid
Katzva believes that the emergence and signing of this document “…was the
summit point of the policy of détente. The principal achievement
of the USSR was the acknowledgement of the inviolability of post-war borders
in Europe. In the name of this, the Soviet leadership agreed to announce
freedom of speech, the press, freedom of movement, exchange of information,
etc.”
Historian Oleg Platonov is of a totally different opinion and he is not
alone in this. He tends to regard the Concluding Act of the Helsinki conference
as a serious defeat suffered by Soviet diplomacy, because “…Leonid Brezhnev
and [Foreign Minister] Andrei Gromyko and their cosmopolitan-minded advisers
in actual fact went along with all that the western countries propositioned.
These states managed to foist upon the Soviet authorities their own terms
and rules of the game. The result was a document that was wholly in the
interests of the USA and its allies, but not the Soviet Union.
Even though the document stipulated the post-war borders in Europe, nonetheless,
it allowed for their alteration by ‘peaceful means’. It was this exact
phrasing that was later resorted to by the West in braking up the USSR,
the GDR and Yugoslavia.
In questions of humanitarian cooperation, freedom of movement, exchange
of ideas and information the Soviet side wholly accepted the positions
of the West. Thus, the spiritual values of Russia and its state sovereignty
were put to hazard. Thanks to this concession, western states to a great
degree legalized their subversive activity against the USSR, empowering
a handful of dissidents, far removed from the interests of the Russian
people, to become the proponents of ideas of the so-called ‘free world’.
And finally, the western diplomats were also successful in questions of
economy, since they succeeded in preserving intact the trade and economic
embargo, the financial and currency quarantine, erected around the USSR.”
Oleg Platonov insists that incoherent and overly yielding attitude displayed
by the USSR in relations with the west, as well as the deteriorating home
economy, couldn’t but impact soviet ties with countries of the Warsaw Pact.
The historian writes, for example, “Veiled by the outwardly loyal attitude
of Warsaw pact countries to the Soviet Union, there was an increasing manifestation
of pervading western influence. As a rule there were two groups in the
leadership of East European countries: one was oriented to the USSR, and
the other – to the West. The first was comprised of Ministers of Defense
and Internal Affairs, top Party Functionaries. The second group comprised
prime-ministers, Ministers of Foreign Affairs, and of economic offices.
As KGB General Nikolai Leonov wrote in his book “The Hard Times”, “pro-western
orientation of a part of the party-state apparatus was cleverly disguised,
masked by effusive declarations of a friendly nature”. Behind the Soviet
leadership’s back, some east-European allies (like Hungary and Poland)
were conducting covert negotiations with the West regarding credits, thus
gradually falling into economic dependence from western states.”
In the second half of the 1970’s Soviet-American relations began to decline.
One of the reasons for this was the support offered by USA President Jimmy
Carter to Soviet so-called ‘human rights activists’, or in other words
– dissidents. This couldn’t but irritate the leadership of the USSR.
The arms race was gathering strength. After the signing of the Treaty on
Comprehensive Security and Cooperation in Europe the USSR too a decision
to deploy in Eastern Europe medium range SS-20 missiles. These missiles
didn’t come under the category stipulated in the agreements on limitation
of strategic weapons.
In response, in 1979 the USA decided to deploy in Western Europe its ‘cruise
missiles’ and medium-range missiles “Pershing-2”, capable of reaching the
territory of the USSR.
The tension in relations between the USSR and the USA and western countries
spiraled after the introduction of Soviet troops into Afghanistan in December
1979. According to the announcement of the then leadership of the country,
this was done in response to ‘numerous requests of the leadership of the
Democratic Republic of Afghanistan and in the name of its security’. Leonid
Brezhnev, under whose leadership this war started, never lived to see its
end, since he died in 1982. Soviet troops spent ten years fighting in Afghanistan.
15 thousand soldiers and officers laid down their lives there…
We only briefly touched upon the basic aspects of Soviet foreign policy.
International activity in the epoch of Leonid Brezhnev was so intense and
rich in events, it’s impossible to do justice to all of them.
In conclusion, let us just say that the policy of the Brezhnev administration
in international affairs traversed a complex and contradictory path from
brusque confrontation with the west to détente, and then from détente
to a fresh spiral of deterioration. The foreign policy of the USSR was
founded on the concepts of ideological opposition and the struggle of two
social systems – capitalism and socialism.
Deplorably, by the early 1980’s our country was again being drawn into
a new spiral of the arms race. This served to undermine the soviet economy
even more.
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