Mikhail Gorbachev is associated with so called “Perestroika” or restructuring. That period of Russia’s history, according to Gorbachev himself, “had a tremendous impact on the developments in our country, in Europe, and in the world”. We thought it would be of interest to you to learn about his own estimation of that period. With this in mind, we’ve decided to acquaint you with some fragments of Gorbachev’s speech at Harvard University, USA, in which he looked back on “perestroika”. He delivered that speech on November 11, 2002.
Even today, some people are still debating whether “perestroika” was inevitable, whether it was necessary. I must say that we, in Gorbachev Foundation in Moscow, decided to celebrate the 10th anniversary of the beginning of “perestroika”. And, we decided to do it by conducting an opinion poll. The Russian Academy of Sciences helped us to conduct that poll in various regions of the country. We asked the Russian people whether reforms were necessary. Whether they ought to have been launched. At that time, 42% said ‘yes, absolutely, reforms were necessary’. 45%, however, said ‘no, they never should have been started’. So, this shows the attitude ten years after the beginning of “perestroika”. Nevertheless, I believe that this is very positive, that the response is actually very positive. Half of the people of the country, half of the population agrees that “perestroika” was necessary. And the poll was happening in 1995, when people had been badly affected by the break up of the country, by the shock therapy, the destructive impact of the cowboy method of economic reform, when most of the people in Russia lived in poverty and hardship. Nevertheless, 42% said ‘yes, “perestroika” was necessary’. And, even more than that, in that poll, I was affected by other replies. For example, people were asked what they thought about the rescinding of Article Six of the Soviet Constitution, under which the Communist Party was the leading force, the dominating force in the country. People were asked what they thought about political pluralism. People were asked what they thought about the democratic changes, what they thought about the freedoms and rights of the individual. For the first time in Russia’s thousand year history, there had been free elections. So, people were asked what they thought about that, and also about freedom of religion. And to all those questions, 60 to 70% of the people answered positively, answered ‘yes’. And I believe that this, in a way, is an endorsement. And this is ground for hope that, after a period of hardship and difficulty, after learning how to use the new Democratic freedoms and rights, the new Democratic tools, the people will be able to pull the country out of the crisis, out of the continuing crisis, and to build a new Russia, to build a free and Democratic Russia. Over the past few years, the same polling organization, the Russian Center for the Study of Public Opinion, has been conducting polls. And they have been asking people “what kind of Russia would you like to live in”. 80% of the people, every year, reply, “We want to live in a free and democratic Russia”. So, from this standpoint, we can say, even today, that “perestroika” has succeeded. People don’t want to go back. And this is particularly true among young people, who will be shaping Russia of the future…” “I believe that “perestroika” started at a time when it was necessary, and when the country was ripe for “perestroika”. Not only objective conditions were in place, but also the subjective conditions were in place for it. “Perestroika” could not have started because of the initiative from below. It could not have started outside the Party system. And sometimes I feel it’s funny that some people say that reformers, when they were finally in power, did not have a real plan, a real concept of “perestroika”. Well, it would have been funny had those reformers been able to develop a concept of “perestroika” under the Soviet system when everything was controlled, when everything was under total control. All of those who tried, even attempted to show different views, or dissident views, were either jailed or exiled from the Soviet Union. And therefore, in the Soviet Union, “perestroika” could only have started within the system, within the Party itself, at the moment when the Party and the country was finally led by people who were ready to take the initiative and to take the responsibility for reforms. Not only in our society, but within the Communist Party, finally, we had the people. We had the forces that were ready to take responsibility. I would say that the country was ready for “perestroika” because of all its past sufferings, because of its yearning for reform. But, we needed the courage. And we needed to be able to take a tremendous risk to start this kind of reform in the Soviet Union. People are asking today whether “perestroika” still has a future, or whether it is all in the past. If you look at “perestroika” as a concept, as a strategy, as a strategic choice, then I believe “perestroika” is still all in the future. After my resignation, after I stepped down from the presidency of the Soviet Union, someone said the era of Gorbachev is over. And I replied, at that time, and I still reply that the era of Gorbachev is just beginning. This is because the choice in favor of freedom, democracy, market economics, in favor of a more humane society, in favor of political and intellectual pluralism, this is something that we are still mastering, that we are still developing. The goals, the objectives are still in the future. And when I was being accused of not being resolute enough, I said that we would need at least 20, up to 30 years to put “perestroika” on track, and to make it embrace the entire society. And again from this standpoint, and also from the standpoint of the new thinking on which we based our foreign policy, everything is yet ahead of us. And I see that even today, the concepts, the approaches to international politics that we adopted are very relevant. Today national interests are often being hyped, and some people are rejecting our approach. We were saying, yes, national interests are important, but we should look for a balance of national interest. We should not impose our interests on all other countries. We recognized the need for equal, equitable cooperation. We said that no nation can dominate, and no nation should try to govern the world from one center. Again, all of these things are still quite relevant. We are learning to live with these principles, and it’s very important to watch the developments underway now. The pace of reform, the pace of change is a very crucial issue. If you try to insist on realistic pace of change, if you insist on that and impose an unrealistically rapid pace of change, then it is reckless, and could have very bad consequences. Professor Marceau of France once asked me whether I thought that the criticism that I was working too slowly, that I was taking decisions too slowly, whether that criticism was valid. And I said, “Well, I think that indeed sometimes we work too slow”. She replied, “I believe that, in fact, you took a very rapid pace of change and society couldn’t digest change so rapidly.” And I agree with this. I believe that we were facing a country that was so vast, where there were 200 ethnic groups and nationalities and languages, different religions, different cultures, where there was a lot of militarism, heavy industry, monopoly, a total monopoly of one political party in the country. This is what we were facing, and this is the country in which several generations of our people lived for more than 70 years. We had to bear in mind that this was a very difficult country to reform. We, I think, bore it in mind, but we did not fully know our country. And therefore, we had sometimes to put a break on developments. And whenever we did that, the media complained Gorbachev is acting too slowly. He is being influenced by the conservative forces, etc... …Whenever you’re told that someone knows all about “perestroika”, and about the underlying reasons for “perestroika” and what kind of change happened, what kind of lessons we must draw from “perestroika” in our huge country, well, let us say we should wait, and we will find the answers in the future. The Gorbachev Foundation, of which I am president, is working to study “perestroika”. We have the library and the archive of “perestroika”, a public affairs center. We hold conferences and workshops and meetings, working together with other think tanks and academic centers. We are studying what happened during “perestroika”, and how it is still influencing what is happening in the world. The 20th century for Russia was a century of search. There was the era of Lenin, the totalitarian period of Stalin, the period of “perestroika”. But, there is no firewall, there is no wall of China between these different periods, because even though the country and the people change, it is still the same country. And it would be both immoral and historically wrong to totally negate any part of our history, any part of the work of generations. This was what history willed. And every generation tried to do its best. Some succeeded more than the others. It depended on many factors. So, I call upon people to know history, to learn from history, to learn from the mistakes and also from the positive experiences. One thing is clear, particularly for Russia. You cannot push the process artificially. And from this standpoint, I would say that a very important issue always is the cost of reforms, the price that people pay for reforms. And based on this criterion, I would evaluate the results of reforms, I would evaluate the results of certain periods in history. During the years of Stalinism, during the years of the totalitarian system, our country was alive, our country was building itself. It was industrialized, it created a science and a culture that were outstanding. But, too many people perished, too many people died because of repressions, because of collectivization, because the peasants, many peasants were regarded as almost the enemies of the people. So, based on that criterion, we also evaluate the results of the Yeltsin reforms. This was the time when we saw some positive changes. We also saw that many democratic institutions were preserved. The country was moving toward market economics. People understood that they should not expect the government to solve all their problems. That they have to take the initiative, and that they have to live their own life. For people formerly of the Soviet Union, that was very important. They used to depend on the government. Also during those years, young businessmen became a factor in our society, particularly those businessmen that were not plundering the country. But, there were also many more negative aspects in how those reforms were conducted. The result was that two-thirds of the people of Russia lived in poverty and hardship. It was too high a price. So, to conclude, I think that if you ask me today whether I am happy, whether I am pleased with the way things are in my country, whether what is happening today is in conformity, is consistent with the ideas that we tried to implement, it would be wrong for me to say that nothing is really changing, has been changing over the past years. But I have to say that a lot of things are very alarming to me, are of deep concern to me. When the Soviet Union broke up, once again geopolitics became the name of the game, and once again an attempt was made to re-divide the world into spheres of influence. The charter of Paris for the future of Europe was forgotten, even though it was a very good blueprint for European security. We saw many conflicts. And the countries in transition, the countries that had ended their totalitarian regimes saw models imposed on them from outside. And some people from Harvard who were active in Russia, helped Russia in a way that wasn’t really appropriate. But we’re not blaming Harvard, we’re not blaming others. We’re blaming ourselves, because we tried to imitate instead of developing what is good for us. So, once again, we’re not blaming Harvard; it was just a few people from Harvard who tried to impose a model that was too radical for Russia, that was too laissez-faire for Russia.” Today’s edition is devoted to a period of Russia’s history which received the name of ‘perestroika’ and is linked with the name of Mikhail Gorbachev – the first and last President of the USSR. On March 2nd 2006, the day when Mikhail Gorbachev marked his 75th birth anniversary, replying to a journalist’s question regarding the thoughts that assailed him on that particular occasion, the one-time President of the USSR said: “What thoughts?.. Why, the thought that I shall cross this threshold and move on ahead!” And what about the Russian people? What is their attitude towards Mikhail Gorbachev? A very representative poll that embraced 1600 people, conducted on the eve of the memorable anniversary by the Yuri Levada Analytical Centre, showed that 49% of those polled display a total indifference towards Gorbachev these days; 11% feel a dislike towards him, and 9% feel irritated by the mere mention of his name. Almost fifteen years after the curtain dropped on the ‘perestroika’ era, Gorbachev is still just as unpopular in his home country. Why is this the case? Here are opinions of representatives of two diametrically opposed camps: Liberal-Democrats and Communists, which were voiced in one of the Russian radio programs, dedicated to Mikhail Gorbachev’s 75th anniversary. Yuri Afanasiyev, President of the Russian State Humanitarian University, one of the inspirators of ‘perestroika’, said: “On the whole, I would classify his activity, his contribution to history, as positive. However, with all due respect, Mikhail Gorbachev’s persona, as well as his activity as General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, are not only contradictory, but even paradoxical. The principal word that is linked with this activity of his is FREEDOM, an advance towards freedom made by him personally, and together with him – the population of the former Soviet Union. The word that comes next is GLASNOST. This is the very word that we might say became a pivotal one in rendering all the ensuing events IRRIVERSIBLE. Ever new pages of our history came into being after that… The main sins that the Communists attribute to him are: that he undermined the CPSU, brought about the collapse of the Soviet Union, and downfall of socialism. The paradox lies in the fact that Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev himself is convinced he had devoted all his efforts to the preservation of the CPSU, the consolidation of socialism and strengthening of the Soviet Union. Here is an opinion from Yuri Ivanov, a representative of the Communist Party faction in the Russian Parliament: “At the time, the situation in the Soviet Union drastically called for reforms. However, as our ill luck would have it, these reforms were set into motion by a man whose personality simply didn’t measure up to the task. The population of our country gave an adequate evaluation of the Gorbachev phenomenon! When Gorbachev decided to run in the presidential race of 1996, he claimed a mere 0,5% of the votes. What more is there to say!” And now let’s return to the events of 1982, which came on the heels of the demise of Leonid Brezhnev. By the end of the Brezhnev era the catastrophic state of the Soviet economy was an eyesore… Brezhnev’s successor, former KGB officer Yuri Andropov, in his first official appearance was obliged to speak openly of the drastic fall of production efficiency. In the words of historian Leonid Katzva, “Yuri Andropov realized that labor productivity had to be boosted and capital stock used with greater efficiency. He deemed it expedient to allow greater independence of industrial enterprises and state collective farms, as was the case in Hungary at the time. But his principal aim was to ensure ‘law and order’ inside the country. Andropov’s time witnessed numerous corruption scandals. Some of the principle figures in Moscow’s trade elite were arrested, and it became obvious that it all led to the very top. Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs Yuri Churbanov, Leonid Brezhnev’s son-in-law, was arrested, while the Minister himself was removed from his post and, while awaiting trial, committed suicide. Another applied method of ‘instigating order’ was toughening labor discipline. Absence from work and tardiness were heavily reprimanded. The Militia stopped people out in the streets and public places to check their documents, in a bid to find out why they were out and about during work hours. It all went as far as check-ups and arrests in public bathhouses! Thus, while Yuri Andropov headed the Communist Party and Soviet state, administrative measures were given priority attention. All this serves as proof that at the time the top party brass didn’t fully realize the extent to which the profound crisis had affected the country. In the second half of 1983 Yuri Andropov was already gravely ill, and in February 1984 he passed away. He was succeeded by Konstantin Chernenko, a former party functional bureaucrat, who was able to make a career thanks to his proximity to Leonid Brezhnev. Historian Leonid Katzva says that by the time Konstantin Chernenko was elected to the top party post he was already terminally ill, and adds: “While he held the top post, all attempts to reform society ground to a halt. Anti-corruption trials ended in the execution of the Head of Moscow’s Trade Department and a number of Directors of the capital’s largest stores. Yuri Andropov’s pet project aimed at boosting labor discipline similarly petered out.” Konstantin Chernenko’s time in power to a great extent resembled Brezhnev’s. However, it lasted only slightly over a year. In March 1985 Chernenko passed away. And so that was when 54-year-old Mikhail Gorbachev was elected to the post of General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU. Against the backdrop of his almost-senile predecessors, he produced the impression of a young and vigorous man. His appearance sparked a speedy personnel reshuffle. Thus, 56-year-old Nikolai Ryzhkov was elected to head the government. At the April Plenary meeting of the Central Committee of the CPSU in 1985 the task was set to whip up the country’s socio-economic advance. It was believed that this could be brought about by introducing state-of-the-art achievements of scientific-industrial progress, particularly in the sphere of machine-building, which was witnessing an 80% growth in capital investments. Social problems were marked out as priority projects: housing construction, food supplies to the population, improvement of the health service and education. However, it was the field of industry that was still afforded the greatest attention. Some of the leading party functionaries realized they needed to alter the entire economic system of the country. They offered to decentralize management, broaden the rights of industrial enterprises and introduce cost-accounting with more decision. However, a greater part of the party and state apparatus believed that there was no need for reforms – it was enough to simply reinforce discipline. Analyzing the results of the 1985 April Plenary meeting of the CPSU historian Leonid Katzva drew the following conclusion: “In effect, the decisions of the Plenary meeting testify that in the mid-1980s the new leadership didn’t have any planned program of reforms. If there were any ideas regarding transforming the economy, they were limited to a repetition of the economic reform of the 1960s. Dominating attention was given to technical and technological progress. Moreover, at the beginning of Mikhail Gorbachev’s stay in office the authorities still chose to settle most problems through administrative means, as was the case under Andropov.” For example, on May 7th 1985 a Decree of the CPSU Central Committee and USSR Council of Ministers was adopted “On measures to fight alcoholism”. In line with it, the so-called anti-alcohol campaign was launched. It was conducted in a barefaced and brusque manner: all production of alcohol, both vodka and wines, was drastically cut; vineyards were destroyed, wineries ruined. And huge queues of people formed outside the dwindling number of wine stores. The bungled anti-drinking campaign resulted in spiraling drug addiction and toxicomania, and a rise in surrogate alcohol. Of course, the entire campaign sparked the indignation of the population, while the state coffers suffered serious set-backs. There was no other means of bringing in the revenue that alcohol production had ensured, while all the promises of the country’s leadership to boost the sale of consumer goods remained on paper. Already in 1986 it became clear that the course for acceleration was ineffective. Serious economic reforms were called for. So the spring of 1986 witnessed the beginning of so-called ‘perestroika’. However, there was no strategy of ‘perestroika’. Besides, the leadership didn’t dare embark on reforms in the field of property rights and price formation. They feared catastrophic social upheavals. In the meantime, the old administrative system ceased to function, while the new market mechanism was as yet nonexistent. This led to a break-up of economic ties and placed the country on the brink of an economic catastrophe and starvation. The spring of 1986 is linked in our minds with not only the beginning of perestroika, but one of the greatest tragedies in this country’s history.
There had long been problems at the Chernobyl plant, but all the information was strictly classified. The accident made society realize the importance of glasnost, or public knowledge. In January 1987, appearing at the Central Committee Plenary meeting, Mikhail Gorbachev announced that perestroika was possible only on the basis of democracy, and called for broadening glasnost. That same year 1987 witnessed a mass exoneration of victims of reprisals of Stalin’s time. After the Plenary meeting there began to appear more critical publications in the press. Literary efforts of emigrants and writers that had been under reprisals - such as Vladimir Nabokov and Andrei Platonov - were now openly published. Literary magazines published many works that had never before been allowed by the rigorous censorship. Publicistic articles advocating market reforms also insistently appeared in the press. Television, too, was embraced by this process. Intoxicated from this unheard-of freedom, some writers and journalists lost all sense of measure and went to extremes, reveling in their country’s failings and even attempting to malign its history. This aroused popular indignation, particularly among veterans of World War Two. Similarly incensed were venerators of Joseph Stalin, who suffered much abuse at the hands of those who exposed his personality cult. Historian Leonid Katzva in this connection recalls an article by a teacher from Leningrad (now St.Petersburg) Nina Andreyeva, entitled “I Cannot Go Back on My Principles”. The author subjected the proponents of perestroika to severe criticism for forfeiting the class approach, and in turn sang praise to Joseph Stalin. Many local newspapers reprinted this article. A week later, after Mikhail Gorbachev returned from abroad, the leading party newspaper “Pravda” published an article in response, “Principles of Perestroika: Revolutionary Thinking and Actions”. The author – a Politburo member Alexander Yakovlev, referred to Andreyeva’s article as a ‘manifesto of the anti-perestroika forces’. After this, the attack on Joseph Stalin’s persona in the mass media gathered fresh force. The mass media also voiced previously unheard-of criticism directed against the founder of the Soviet state Vladimir Lenin, and bolshevist policy of the first years of the revolution. The January 1987 Plenary meeting of the Party Central Committee, which we mentioned earlier, adopted a decree on reforming the political system of the USSR. Deputies of all Soviets were to be elected on alternative basis. Party life, too, saw the introduction of alternative selections to party committees by secret ballot. Within the fold of the CPSU there flared up heated debates between conservatives and advocates of reforming the political system. At the 19th Party Conference in June 1988 a decision was adopted to form a lawful state, to strip party bodies of government functions and broaden the rights of national republics. The principal result of the conference was a decision to convene the 1st Congress of People’s Deputies of the USSR. This Congress was to gather 2250 deputies and they, in turn, would have to elect from amongst themselves a permanently functioning Supreme Soviet. The electors, inspired by the opportunity to make a real choice, displayed remarkable political awareness and actively showed up to vote. Moreover, they frequently voted against the existing powers. Many leaders of regional and district party organizations suffered defeat at the elections. While in Moscow it was Boris Yeltsin’s time of triumph. In 1987 he became First Secretary of the Moscow Party Committee. Lashing out against the lagging pace of perestroika, he was subjected to persecution by Mikhail Gorbachev and a highly authoritative Politburo member Yegor Ligachov. According to historian Leonid Katzva, “Once he fell into disfavor, Boris Yeltsin became transformed from a top-ranking party functionary into a politician who enjoyed tremendous popular support. At the elections to the 1st Congress of USSR Deputies 90% of the electorate voted for him, despite the fact that the administrative powers of the country moved heaven and earth to bar Yeltsin from the Congress.” The Congress took place in May-June 1989. Its sessions were broadcast live on TV and radio, drawing the undivided attention of a majority of the population of the USSR. The Congress elected a two-chamber parliament, which Mikhail Gorbachev was elected to head. At the Congress deputies who were critical of Gorbachev’s policy united to form a so-called Interregional Group. This group became a democratic opposition to the Gorbachev regime. Its co-chairmen were Boris Yeltsin, Academician Andrei Sakharov, President of the Russian State Humanitarian University historian Yuri Afanasiyev and economist Gavriil Popov. With the emergence of the Interregional group, Mikhail Gorbachev was no longer the sole leader of the process of reforms. The rift between him and the democrats began to deepen.
A month later, at elections to People’s Deputies of the Russian Federation, the alliance “Democratic Russia” spoke out for doing away with article 6 of the Constitution and eliminating party organizations at enterprises. Inside the CPSU, the same demands were put forward by the so-called “Democratic Platform”. As a result, at the 3rd Congress of People’s Deputies in March 1990, the affronting article was abolished. This was a powerful blow at the Communist Party. As for Mikhail Gorbachev, at that Congress he was elected First President
of the USSR. In the words of historian Leonid Katzva, “Many democratically-minded
politicians believed that a president ought to be elected by popular vote.
However, Mikhail Gorbachev, who had lost most of his popular support by
then, had no intention to run the risk, and preferred to be elected at
the Congress. He solicited around 60% of the votes.” This boded nothing
good for Mikhail Gorbachev…
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We devote
this program to Mikhail Gorbachev, the first and the last President of
the USSR, whose 75th birth anniversary was marked March 2nd 2006.
On April
26th the fateful accident occurred at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant
in the environs of Ukraine’s capital Kiev. The consequences of this tragedy
made themselves felt beyond the boundaries of Ukraine, spreading to Russia
and Byelorussia.
At the 2nd
Congress of People’s Deputies, in December 1989 the Interregional group
of deputies demanded the annulment of article 6 of the USSR Constitution
that proclaimed the CPSU ‘the leading and guiding force of Soviet society,
the nucleus of its political system’. However, a majority of those at the
Congress rejected this appeal.
